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The Face of the Market 
Abstract 
 
 This thesis reviews the effect on economic openness that can be established by the 
presence of strong Global Compact local networks. The work identifies three measures of 
openness and four sets of domestic conditions in which the Global Compact operates, 
respectively: (1) prevalence of trade, (2) measures of foreign direct investment and foreign 
portfolio investment and (3) policy indicators of openness, in respect to democracies with (a) 
strong local networks or (b) weak local networks, as well as autocratic regimes with (c) strong or 
(d) weak local networks. A comparative study follows, looking at twenty-three years of data 
across fifty countries exemplifying the above domains, to determine what impact, if any, the 
Global Compact has had on economic trends and policy. By measuring the reciprocal effect that 
enhanced corporate responsibility is expected to have on public trust (reflected in economic 
policy), the author purports to strengthen an already robust business case for responsible and 
sustained membership in the Global Compact by demonstrating its utility in facilitating business 
friendly political climates in its host countries.  
 
Introduction 
Capitalism has evolved to become a fiercely magnetic force. Through a phenomenon 
loosely referred to as globalization, "a process of intensification of social and economic relations 
across borders" (Palazzo & Scherer, p.234), nations rely on one another's enterprise for 
financial wellbeing as never before in history. A relatively new corporate responsibility initiative, 
the Global Compact (GC) established in 2000, has grown to become the world's biggest, 
comprising over 8000 businesses in 140 countries, and accounting for around $25 trillion in 
financial assets. How has the Global Compact affected economic policy in countries with strong 
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GC local networks? Of particular interest to this paper are economic policies related to trade 
liberalization, as well as levels of trade and investment.   
Because policy depends on governance structure, this paper will also pay attention to 
the type of government in each of the countries sampled for data, as well as "amount" of 
democracy, should the country hold democratic elections. Because businesses adhering to the 
ten GC principles on human rights, environment, labor and anti-corruption should have a net 
positive impact on the communities in which they operate, it is expected that strong GC 
networks operating in highly democratic environments should result in proliferating trade 
agreements and other pro-liberalizing trends. Weak GC networks should result in fewer 
liberalizing policies, while the inverse should be true of dictatorships. Weak GC networks should 
result in mild efforts to protect native markets from external influence, and strong GC networks 
should result in sustained efforts to protect markets. The presence of a strong Global Compact 
network in a democratic society should positively correlate with trade liberalization in both the 
public realm and the private sector.  
The for rationale for why this should be so is predicated on Washington Consensus 
norms, broadly predicting the increased opportunities for ownership and representation that 
democracy affords will encourage people to head to the polls out of financial self-interest. The 
will of the people, manifest in voting patterns, should persuade governments to open their 
borders to more opportunity. Often this has not been the case. Whether to protect jobs or as a 
reaction against foreign multinationals enabling human rights abuse, failing to stand up for labor 
rights or fueling corruption, populations in democracies have often voted in the opposite 
direction. If the GC is having a positive impact on the three areas mentioned above, this trend 
away from liberalization should be mitigated. Conversely, in dictatorships or countries with only 
nominal democracy, multinationals or domestic businesses being influenced by a set of 
externally originated principles should represent a threat to domestic businesses, many of which 
will have influence in government. The foreign precedent set by alien norms of good 
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governance can be expected to highlight abuses by local firms and potentially conflict with the 
practices of illiberal governments. These relatively unconstrained governments will seek to 
minimize a meddlesome foreign influence, in proportion to its presence and activity in the 
country.     
Context 
The decade preceding the 2008 financial crisis saw extraordinary economic 
developments riding on the back of freer capital flows and sustained five percent annual trade 
growth. Trade crested at a full quarter of global GDP in 2007 as technological improvements 
facilitated cheaper shipping and communication became faster and more broadly accessible. 
Widespread enthusiasm for trade liberalization had seen the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 1995, which helped to drive the increasing density of global ties over 
subsequent years. The implications for world poverty were dramatic. The number of people in 
the developing world living on less than $1.25 per day dropped from its share of 30% of the 
population in the year 2000 to just above 10% now. The size of the middle class in Latin 
America has doubled, while in Asia it has increased by a factor of seven (Economist, September 
13 2014, p.29-33). The growth burst came to a dramatic end in 2008, and today the 
performance of developing countries looks far more modest than in the years before the crisis. 
As one side of the globe grows it makes demands, while the other side rises to meet the 
opportunities provided and enrich itself in the process. So too the supply side must contract 
when economic mismanagement and an irresponsible financial culture put an end to the fat 
years. An infinitely complex and all-too-often unstable equation binds the economic fortunes (or 
misfortunes) of seven-plus billion people to one another. 
The global trend of opening borders and reducing barriers, coupled with technological 
developments and social amalgamation, have presented businesses with both opportunities and 
challenges. Environmental risks, terrorism, disease and violent protest, as well as increased 
activism from civil society, labor unions and other agitators for change have become a great 
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concern to today's capitalists as they move the means of production further south into areas 
with questionable rule of law. Institutions traditionally charged with mediating conflict on behalf 
of the private sector, like the International Labor Organization or the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development have waning influence in these new regions of production. 
Business is being done in the gray areas. The need for trust between stakeholders, 
governments and businesses has never been so acute, and in the wake of the 2008 Financial 
Crisis, so too for the need for trust between business and investors.   
Literature Review 
 The United Nations Global Compact represents a significant paradigm shift for an 
organization that has long been seen as operating in fundamentally different spheres to those 
inhabited by the private sector. Whenever the world’s largest international organization and 
trans- and multinational corporations found themselves confronting a common issue, the 
relationship usually gravitated toward a notoriously adversarial status quo, which found little 
ground for cooperation. Since then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched the Global Compact 
(GC) in 2000, speculation has abounded about the means by which the initiative might bridge 
the yawning ideological divide between the two international forces. The GC is an attempt at 
facilitating a mutually beneficial collaborative process, to a modest extent reigning in the 
freedom enjoyed by the private sector by promoting aspirational values and reporting measures. 
The real impact of the GC is a subtle normative force, a force that some authors on the subject 
hope can change the very culture of international business.  
The initiative is still young, barely in its teens. Correspondingly, most of the literature on 
the subject remains speculative, or else of the “first decade in review” order. There still exists a 
lot of space for what the GC will evolve into and where the collaboration might go, but, actual 
measures of impact are scant. A central theme has been to judge how to frame the Global 
Compact- through what prism might policy makers and businesses usefully view the subject? 
The literature has prescribed five such prisms: 1) as rapprochement between the United Nations 
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and the private sector, 2) as the new wave of corporate responsibility, 3) humanized 
globalization, 4) facilitating inclusivity and 5) a means for building trust between stakeholders, 
institutions and society. Two key areas of criticism also exist, and certainly not independent of 
the above perspectives on the GC. There have been concerns voiced that the Global Compact 
will function as a species of Trojan horse, allowing the private sector to influence UN activity and 
essentially “corporatizing” a humanitarian organization. There has yet to be provided any real 
basis for such a fear, therefore it has not been included in the criticisms. First, the relative lack 
of interest shown in the United States toward the GC has yielded far fewer signatories than 
hoped for (this pertains strongly to the fifth prism, that of trust). This weakens both the scope 
and credibility of the GC. Second, there are concerns over the accountability measures imposed 
on corporations by the initiative. Are they weak enough that the goodwill of the United Nations 
can simply be exploited for a time, to result only in a slap on the wrist? Can the institutional rod 
prove effective in dis-incentivizing the more abhorrent behavior observed in multinationals?     
The view of the GC as UN rapprochement with the corporate world is more elaborate 
than its face value suggests. At its foundation is the story of Annan’s progressive vision, to co-
opt rather than combat, and the contentious new frontier of global governance that this has 
opened. Most UN advocates writing about the GC can’t resist gushing for at least a few 
paragraphs of historical context, pleased by the magnanimity shown and genuinely excited by 
the new possibilities presented. Beyond this is a more interesting story, one of finding common 
ground, and of fortuitous timing. As great segments of the global economy become de-
materialized, the flow of information grows ever faster and more accessible, and globalization 
thickens, giddy speculation over the creative destruction to be wrought generates ideas like that 
of a coming sustainable enterprise economy (SEE). Not only academics, but governments, 
businesses and NGOs have taken particular interest in SEE and discourses like it. McIntosh 
and Waddock document dozens of roundtable discussions involving GC stakeholders on every 
level, taking place all over the world, and the shared sense from public and private alike that an 
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edge can be gained by collaboration, to the advantage of both. Sustainable enterprise and 
development has been the province of the UN and governments, and together they have much 
to share to the mutual benefit of all involved. The private sector is taking the reigns in other 
areas once in the near-exclusive charge of government, increasingly taking a hand in education 
and HIV prevention, as well as other public health domains. Symbiosis is necessary for the 
effective transition and sharing of responsibility. These are case specific examples meant to 
demonstrate a pervasive thread, the cadence of business and the international community 
finding a need for one another’s knowledge and best practices, the need for a forum, a learning 
tool, and the shared need for enhanced legitimacy, through shared goals and aspirations 
(McIntosh & Waddock, 2010).  
      Addressing the issue of legitimacy, John Ruggie, instrumental in the creation of the GC, took 
on the challenge of fitting human rights onto the agenda of private business. According to 
Leisinger, Cramer and Natour, multinationals are highly sensitive to any perception of their 
breaching human rights, but since the concept itself was created with nation states in mind, 
relevance to business and a corresponding protocol were not easy to grasp. Leisinger et al’s 
article therefore describes Ruggie’s efforts as adapting the code of conduct from the nation 
state format to business, disposing of the grey area and replacing anomie with a procedural tool 
for private industry. The benchmark phrase in his work became “a duty to respect human 
rights”, and the guidelines behind it are becoming the status quo for ethical behavior in 
multinationals. The idea of a “regulatory framework” suggests an earlier period of UN 
encroachment on private activity rather than rapprochement. Such language might be imagined  
to ruffle private feathers, but it was at the request of industry leaders that the guidelines were 
drawn up, having recognized that a code would be necessary for them to profit from the GC 
(Leisinger et al., 2010).  
Other bodies of work frame the GC as an essential part of the new wave of corporate 
responsibility. Since the 2008 financial crisis, business has heard demands for sustainable, 
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responsible activity grow louder than before, as a global audience settles uneasily on the 
realization that periodic financial shocks are becoming the new normal. In their broad analysis of 
the GC, Rasche and Kell present the subject through this prism by focusing on “globalizing 
corporate responsibility”. The rise of new economic giants in countries like China and India have 
increased possibilities for transcontinental business collaboration, as well as economic 
interdependence, and through this process certain global governance gaps have been revealed. 
It is these fissures that the GC was designed to address. Rather than attempt to leverage public 
skepticism in business, the GC addresses corporate responsibility by providing an organic 
framework through which to mitigate risk, to learn, and to help position and organize for the 
future. For multinationals to meet growing expectations from their customers to reduce carbon 
emissions and other environmental detractors, guidance and best practices, as well as 
aspirational principles, are provided by the GC (Rasche & Kell, 2013).  
Synergy between good governance norms and financial markets, investors in particular, 
as facilitated by the Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI), is another area of globalized 
corporate responsibility. In his article evaluating the PRI, James Gifford focuses on the 
incentives that have led 700 investors (representing $25 trillion in assets) to sign on to the PRI. 
The Universal Owner hypothesis, at the center of his explanation, is a prime example of the 
process of globalized corporate responsibility, demonstrating the negative impact of 
irresponsible corporate behavior on highly diversified investors. Since investors own a piece of 
the economy, any negative externalities imposed upon it by irresponsible behavior will only 
serve to harm their own interests. Investors have thus come to see the GC and PRI as means to 
shore up their investments and regularize returns (Gifford, 2010).  
Humanizing globalization presents at once the specter of a chirpily optimistic buzz 
phrase and the possibility of being just vague enough to act as a malleable rubric beneath which 
to marry a range of isolated concepts. One year before the launch of the GC, Secretary-General 
Annan proposed a joint effort between the UN and private business to “give a human face to the 
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global market”. The idea of re-anthropomorphizing economic forces seems to form part of the 
very spirit of the GC, making it a viable prism through which to consider the initiative. All ten 
aspirational principles encouraged by the GC on its signatories are of a “Washington 
Consensus nature”, promoting respect for human rights, labor standards, the environment and 
anti-corruption. Guy Ryder writes on the GC’s efforts to promote labor standards from just such 
a perspective, arguing that stakeholder integration is necessary to further labor principles.  
Other literature (McIntosh & Waddock, 2010, Leisinger, Cramer & Natour, 2013, Kell 
2013) points to the GC less as a tool for implementing a humanitarian agenda and more as a 
zeitgeist, harmonizing with the phenomena of 24/7 connectedness, collapsed distances and 
diminishing boundaries. For these authors, the GC humanizes the market by applying human 
experience to it, creating the opportunity to learn in a humanized context and facing down some 
of the exigent circumstances we face as a planet. This approach to the GC implies the need for 
a collective spirit of mutual responsibility and a shared sense of threat and obligation to 
respond. Environmental areas, because of the existential threat found therein, present some of 
the most fertile ground for exposition of a humanizing role for the GC, in tandem with 
sustainable development. Authors have found, unsurprisingly, that this impression of the 
initiative is found more abundantly in the developing world than the developed (McIntosh & 
Waddock, 2010).  
Still other writers have found it appealing to focus on the inclusive nature of the GC. 
After all, no sense of rapprochement, increased responsibility, anthropomorphization or trust 
could be deemed realistic without a strong spirit of inclusivity. From this standpoint, the GC is a 
breathing, adapting, learning tool, “A living, active process for continuous, practical 
improvement” (Kell, 2013) according to Bo Miller (as cited by Georg Kell), Global Director of 
Corporate Citizenship at Dow Chemical. These authors tend to focus on the proliferation of local 
GC networks within the international networks, as well as on the establishment of fora for multi-
stakeholder discourse- a particular trademark of the United Nations. Also within this framework 
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there has been focus on the Principles for Responsible Management Education (PRME), an 
initiative within the GC to disseminate the lessons learned as well as their values to business 
school leaders, establishing a clear foundation for the adoption of GC principles early in the 
lives of tomorrow’s business and investor generations. Within the above-described PRI, a 
particularly successful forum has sprung up to address environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) concerns. The Clearinghouse, as it is known, has been highly effective at bringing 
investors together to apply pressure to other investors to improve ESG performance, share best 
practices and agree on policy (investment) positions on certain issues. Overall, one of the great 
strengths of the inclusivity of the GC, according to the literature, has been the amplified 
involvement of small and medium sized enterprise around the discussion table. This has had 
the effect of infusing new blood into debate circles, of airing out cloistered corporate discourse 
and abating the risks of groupthink that abound at the higher levels of skyscrapers in New York 
and Shanghai (Gifford, 2010).  
The prism of trust is the most open to criticism, as the GC has no mandated code of 
conduct, nor regulatory teeth. Authors point out that the ten principles are an aspirational guide, 
and the reporting mechanisms in place threaten signatories only with de-listment in the event of 
non-compliance. Gilbert and Benham point out that it is the trust placed in the GC by 
stakeholders that mitigates risk by reducing uncertainty and therefore proving advantageous to 
participants. Trust is the key to ensuring that the system actually works to the benefit of those 
involved. It is foundational to the relationships among signatories as well as between the UN 
and private business. Literature on the subject so far has been mostly policy prescriptive and 
focuses on means to increase trust and accountability among participants and across strata 
(Gilbert & Benham, 2013).  
The bulk of the writing on the Global Compact has therefore focused on definition and 
means to realize potential. Certainly a lot of buzz has been generated by the observed reaction 
to the GC across government, business and civil society at large. Certain measurements of 
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impact have been made, largely in assessing the incentives for private business to join up- an 
essential area of study if the GC is to be deemed efficacious. It seems there are positive 
financial returns associated with being an active signatory, and notwithstanding critics 
condemning the GC for a lack of accountability, there are negative financial returns associated 
with de-listment. Some impact-based data has also been analyzed pertaining to the success of 
the GC in improving worker conditions and emphasizing the environment, although any impact 
here is difficult to attribute directly to the Compact because of the near impossibility of isolating 
the cause. Alas, in the ever-thickening world of international political economy, isolating the 
impact of the GC so as to point and say “this causes that” is unlikely at best. Some soft data 
suggests that signing up to the Global Compact does indeed encourage businesses to act in 
more responsible ways, however, due to the proportional dearth of companies signed up, it is 
entirely possible that many of these companies would have behaved so regardless. An equally 
convincing narrative would be “Responsible companies sign up to the GC” instead of 
“Companies sign up to the GC then become increasingly responsible”. There still exists no hard 
data on the effects of the GC on government trust. Many authors reference a need for 
governments to get involved, and increased market openness being a sought-after outcome for 
stakeholders, but as yet no convincing study to suggest that this has been, or is likely to be, the 
case. Two of the strongest participants, India and China, have been increasingly open to foreign 
investment. Just last month India opened up one of its largest energy firms to international 
investors for the first time, while at the same time India stymies landmark WTO agreements. 
What impact is the Global Compact having on economic policy in the developing countries that 
seem to have the most use for it? Can there be a discernible shift in the culture of policymaking 
in these countries brought about by increased trust, inclusivity and perceived corporate 
responsibility? 
In order to test the hypothesis that strong Global Compact networks will have an 
“opening” effect on economic policy and business culture in democracies, this paper will turn to 
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a quantitative analysis of representative countries, described in detail below, in the Methodology 
section. Due to the high volume of data involved in doing so, the discussion will make extensive 
use of graphic analysis to demonstrate observable trends. Following from a description of the 
results will be an analysis of their implications in proving, or disproving, the hypothesis.   
  
Objectives of the Thesis 
As stated earlier, when addressing the World Economic Forum in 1999, then-Secretary 
General Kofi Annan proposed what would become the Global Compact as a way to “put a 
human face on the global market.” As much of the current literature makes note, concerns about 
certain exploitative or irresponsible practices of foreign multinational corporations had fostered 
an apparently adversarial relationship between the private sector and the United Nations. The 
central disputant on behalf of the UN was the General Assembly (GA), which made extensive 
use of its considerable public relations capabilities to broadcast disapproval of a corporate 
culture that was perceived to be inhuman in the utmost degree. The GA’s capacity to make, 
influence or enforce legislation proved incommensurate to the force of its messaging, thus the 
situation became one of verbal hostility without matching political muster. Ensuing frustration 
with the limitations of the bully pulpit was met in the private sector with an enduring suspicion of 
the UN. Annan’s speech marked a moment of potential for reconciliation between the global 
public and the private. It was a top priority from day one, and remains as such to this day, to be 
able to attract business to the table, to convince businesses that filing an annual 
Communication on Progress (COP) will be in their interest, alongside sustained and active 
participation in addressing economic, social and governance (ESG) issues. A cynical view of 
doing business in the modern world has led some to question whether the more cost effective 
way to achieve the bottom line of market profitability wouldn’t be to exploit poor labor conditions 
or a lack of environmental regulations in a host country.  
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The business case for joining the Global Compact has been made by academics, and 
made again (perhaps more conclusively) by the more-than 8000 businesses that have signed 
onto its growing roster. However, the attrition rate, businesses delisted because of a failure to 
comply with the COP requirement, stands at around 30%, still alarmingly high. Business today 
is more mobile than ever before. For every opportunity offered by an emerging labor market in 
which to relocate factors of production and other assets, a challenge tends to rear its head, from 
violent activism to degraded water supplies or unstable governments. Stability is central to 
prosperity, be it for an individual company, a nation, or the international system. The business 
case for the Global Compact, as currently understood, hinges on its capacity to stabilize and 
ameliorate conditions “on the ground”, while showing investors and the public that social 
responsibility is taken seriously by the company leadership. It also hinges on communication. 
Through various fora (such as the PRI Clearing House and established linkages within local 
networks and between global ones), the foundation of the “human face to the market” is to be 
found in the dialogue GC membership facilitates. This very dialogue sets the bar for responsible 
and efficient corporate responsibility, providing tools and best practices for addressing problems 
while participation in the discussion helps polish the public image of businesses involved. After 
only fifteen years it may be too soon to establish whether a significant effect on public opinion 
can be determined by the presence of a strong local GC network, or else the effect may be too 
weak or diluted to measure. Nonetheless it is the aim of this thesis to further the business case 
for GC membership by inquiring into the possibility of such a trend. 
This hypothesis is based on the premise that adherence to the ten principles should 
produce more amenable public opinion visa vis business in countries with strong local networks. 
It follows that a weaker network would produce a less significant effect. Public opinion is 
particularly relevant in democracies because it serves as permission for governments to more 
aggressively address, or adopt a more laissez-faire attitude toward, a particular issue. If the GC 
builds trust among stakeholders, by the same mechanism a more accountable private sector 
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should be able to build trust with the public. That trust can be readily translated into political 
capital reserved for opening up to trade and investment. In cases of governments that have 
build a relationship with their constituents based on staunchly socialist or business-wary 
principles, any improvement in public perception of business may be eschewed from the top 
down. Governments may also choose to trade more and accept greater amounts of investment 
without announcing publicly that much, or any, “opening up” is occurring.  
A significant negative effect can also be expected from the 2008 financial crisis, which, 
regardless of the GC’s best efforts at pluralism, heinously damaged perceptions of global 
finance. Both foreign direct and foreign portfolio investment saw enormous global drops in 
confidence through their association with the firms and practices that wrought havoc on the 
global economy. Businesses also suffered, and through the difficult times faced as a result of 
the downturn and increasing unemployment in many parts of the world public trust in their 
benevolence may have been negatively impacted. Certain industries, particularly in the global 
south, operate in a countercyclical fashion to the trends of the developed economies. In these 
cases the businesses involved should be shielded from the effects described above. It would be 
unreasonable to expect market forces not to play a significant role in affecting the outcomes that 
could ideally be attributed to the GC alone, but as an innovative part of a complex system of 
approaches that increasingly seek to “fly below the radar” of conventional politics, a sustained 
and growing effect on opinion can reasonably be expected. As with all grassroots movements, 
the effect should be an inductive force of influence that ultimately comes to affect policy.  
Other factors sullying the clear waters needed for a conclusive diagnosis include a 
traditionally pro-business/pro-investment orientation, a traditional reliance on primary commodity 
exports, the need for a capital injection stemming from infrastructure needs, post conflict 
settings and the myriad other reasons governments may need fast cash, as well as autocratic 
regimes. Of the above, only one (autocratic regimes) is within the purview of this thesis to 
address and control for. Political science is not conducive to the elegant, black and white 
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research designs of the hard sciences or even psychology. While a few elements, or a handful 
of people can readily enough be pulled into a laboratory and ostracized from many of the 
conditions that would usually affect them, the same cannot be done for Liberia or India. The 
political economies examined by this thesis are for the most part modern or modernizing (for the 
most part depending on more than just resource extraction), and consequently they are each 
awesomely complex, subject to both internal and external environments that are constantly in 
flux. A direct, observable and conclusive causal relationship between variable A, the presence 
of a strong GC local network, and variable B, increased economic openness, cannot reasonably 
be expected in these conditions. The most that may be sensibly asserted from the work will be a 
trend toward openness, which the GC serves to support. The fact of a complicated world 
notwithstanding, it is still an important piece of the puzzle. On an intuitive note, it stands to 
reason that as one side of a relationship changes, that of business toward society, the other will 
also gradually begin to realign and adapt to a changing partner. It’s difficult to think of many 
examples in society where this is not seen to be the case. 
What can be inferred from strong local networks resulting in increasingly open 
economies should be of particular interest to businesses, investors, the United Nations, 
politicians and civil society. If globalized corporate responsibility has prompted greater 
accountability, reinforced trust and soothed the relationship between business and the 
communities in which they operate then a powerful policy tool has been discovered for reversing 
the lackluster economic fortunes of some regions. Business and investment will have found a 
legitimate platform through which to interface in a positive context with their environment, with 
the enormous added benefit of having to contend with more amenable policies. Businesses will 
be offered a convincing argument that, by being part of a responsible GC membership, they are 
creating the foundations of their own 21st century grassroots movement, an advocacy network 
capable of achieving the ends they desire in harmony with their host environment. Such 
approaches have been traditionally been used against their interests and in response to a 
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perceived lack of social responsibility. Many businesses will know, from experience, the efficacy 
of those tactics. With the strategic orientation of the UN shifting toward the inclusion of 
development in more and more aspects of its work, the findings of this thesis should be of 
interest to a significant share of the international organization. With the Global Focal Point 
(GFP) emphasizing development in the practice of peacekeeping, and the necessity of muscular 
development to organs such as UN Habitat, this subject should be of broad interest. Most 
significantly of all, it provides the GC itself with a more robust business case, and should serve 
to persuade members future and present that de-listment is very much against their interests.  
In practice, establishing the kind of causality required by the hypothesis turned out to be 
unrealistic. One the one hand, there are simply too many moving parts to an economy to point 
to one initiative and cite it as the cause of a particular policy direction or business climate. What 
does prove possible, however, has been to establish what kind of environments host, and 
therefore have use for, the Global Compact, and which do not. They tend to correlate fairly 
strongly with investor preferences, as predicted by James Gifford’s literature on the Principles of 
Responsible Investment. Highly extraverted business cultures (those that depend to a large 
degree on trade), however, tend not to favor hosting strong GC networks. The hypothesis must 
therefore be altered to reflect the differing modes of operation between businesses and 
investors. While investors favor environments that embrace ESG norms and corporate 
responsibility, highly extraverted business environments seek advantage by avoiding such 
innovations.       
Methodology 
In order to demonstrate that a relationship exists between trade liberalization and levels 
of GC activity, a contrast will be drawn between countries with strong GC networks versus weak 
ones, as well as democracies versus autocratic states. Sample data will be taken from fifty 
countries, randomly selected from the pool of countries with data available and matching the 
criteria for four categories: democracies with strong local networks, democracies with weak local 
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networks, autocracies with strong local networks, and autocracies with weak local networks. 
The data, available from World Bank and the World Trade Organization, compiled to gauge 
openness of economic policy, will be levels of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), levels of Foreign 
Portfolio Investment (FPI), and openness to trade, calculated as revenue from trade divided by 
GDP, as well as policy indicators of openness (average applied tariffs and ease of starting a 
foreign business). For each of the fifty countries a control sample will be taken, comprising the 
data between 1990 and 2000, before the GC came into being. The data of particular interest for 
this essay will be the twenty-five participating countries' openness between 2000 and 2013. The 
data will be graphically presented in addition to six results tables.  
Before developing a model to assess economic openness, specific economies needed 
to be chosen as exemplars of the four conceptual domains under consideration: democracies 
with strong Global Compact networks, democracies with weak Global Compact networks, 
autocracies with strong Global Compact networks and autocracies with weak Global Compact 
networks. The GC provides a map of its presence across the world on its website, categorizing 
countries as possessing “formal”, “established”, “emerging” or nonexistent networks. For the 
purposes of comparison, only “formal”, the strongest category, was admitted to the 
corresponding “strong network” designation. “Weak networks” are defined as nonexistent or 
“emerging”.  
 The designation of a country as “democratic” or “autocratic” relied on the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2010. This report creates four broad designations as well 
as an individual ranking for the political environment of a given country. The four designations 
are as follows: “Full Democracies”, “Flawed Democracies”, “Hybrid Regimes” and “Authoritarian 
Regimes”. The ideal situation for research would have been to keep the associations “pure”, 
with both autocratic categories of this research limited to “authoritarian regimes” and vice versa 
for democracies and “full democracies”. However, preference was given to a broader and more 
geographically representative dataset, and certain flawed democracies were admitted into both 
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democratic categories (e.g. democracies with strong and democracies with weak networks). To 
balance the equation, an equal number of hybrid regimes were categorized as autocracies. A 
full country list is provided below. 
In the selection of countries, an attempt was made to keep each sample group broadly 
geographically representative, however realities on the ground kept this from being possible to 
the extent desired by pure theoretical intentions. It is simple fact that an autocracy with a weak 
GC network is impossible to find in Europe, or that there is a dearth of democracies with strong 
GC networks in Africa, and none to speak of in the Middle East. With this being said, random 
selection was limited as far as necessary by concerns of continental representation, so as to 
have Latin America or Europe represented by a fixed number of countries in order not to under 
or overplay their influence in a set category. The selection of the countries within a continent 
was random, as far as possible, and determined by a dice roll. However, the continents 
themselves were automatically chosen and allotted a certain number of national 
representatives. Where possible, higher populations (such as Asia) were given weighted 
representation, reflected by more countries from that continent being present in the group. This 
was only an issue for the “democracies with strong networks” category, which boasts 
representatives from Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas. The second broad category to 
define was “autocracies with weak networks”, though here the choice was much more limited to 
Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East. All three regions are represented, and once again their 
specific national representation was selected at random.  
The third and fourth categories are much tighter, and represent almost exhaustive 
samples. Both autocracies with strong GC networks and democracies with weak GC networks 
are fairly aberrant on the world stage. The results go some way toward explaining why this sub-
set has chosen to adopt or shun the GC. Despite their small numbers, the issues that make 
these two sets uniquely problematic are very different. They are very distinctive and bear little in 
common beyond their relative paucity. “Autocracies with strong networks” are limited to Asia 
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and Africa (with one exception), but include two of the world’s biggest economies: Russia and 
China. Investment is subject to the gravitational pull of giant economies, so some graphs are 
controlled for the two nations to demonstrate the magnitude of their effect on a set of otherwise 
small to medium economies. Meanwhile, “democracies with weak networks” are heavily skewed 
towards European nations. Exactly one half of this dataset has acceded to the EU, which 
presents its own issues for the research. The common market exerts a strong influence, through 
its vast incentives for trade and standardization requirements, on the openness of a countries’ 
economic policy. Much of the data provided by World Bank or the World Trade Organization 
treats the EU as one economy and therefore doesn’t go into detail on specific countries. The 
related literature has correspondingly focused on trade within the EU and between the EU and 
other regions, with very little said nowadays about bilateral trade relations between, for instance, 
the Slovak Republic and Russia (OECD Slovak Republic, p. 10).. In fact, the Slovak Republic 
relies to a considerable degree on Russia for energy imports. It stands as the Slovak Republic’s 
second largest individual trading partner after Germany. This information often requires paring 
away from the dominant Union-driven narrative.  
There are many models of economic openness, and over the years these have become 
increasingly sophisticated in terms of structure. Indicators like public availability of high tech 
communications, cultural factors influencing investment or multiplicities of non-tariff barriers to 
trade have been integrated and have served to deepen the content of resulting data, while 
apparently offering nothing toward the creation of any kind of scientific consensus on “the best 
model” (Lane, 2007). For research such as this, with a broad sample base and without a team 
of researchers able to work around the clock to harvest recondite data, a more traditional model 
for assessing the openness of the economies under consideration has been devised. It does, 
however, go to some lengths to create as detailed a picture as possible of the economies in 
which the GC operates (as well as those in which it doesn’t operate). The model is three 
dimensional, examining levels of trade, protectionist policies and investment.  
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Levels of trade comprise the most detailed category, examining trends over a twenty-
three year period beginning in 1990. For each of the fifty countries, trade data was collected as 
the percentage of GDP accounted for by 1) trade in services, 2) trade in merchandise, 3) 
imports of goods and services and 4) exports of goods and services. The four in combination, 
while not drawing an intricate sketch of every highly diversified economy under consideration, 
still gives a strong indication of the quality and character of the respective cultures of trade, how 
important trade is to an economy, and how advanced that economy is (service oriented 
economies generally being considered more modern). The mean average numbers for trade as 
percentage of GDP were taken for each category, each successive year from 1990 to 2013. 
Therefore, the percentage of GDP accounted for by merchandise trade in 2002 among 
democracies with strong global compact networks is presented as a single number (43.18%, 
incidentally)- that number is the category average for the year. In this way, a trend is established 
among the grouping, which becomes significant when graphed in relation to the other three 
groups. The period 1990 to 2000 is relevant as the decade before the GC came into being, and 
therefore as a sort of control period. Though it barely needs expressing, many other things 
happened in the early 2000s that can account for changes in the makeup of globalization. Also, 
most of the countries involved in this research signed up around 2004 (the modal average year), 
with some before and some after. This may serve to complicate the results, however, it is the 
contention of this work that considerable substance can be inferred from the findings, and 
justifiably used to address the research question.   
The second temporal measure of trend is in investment. Once again, an average is 
taken from 1990 to 2013 across fifty countries divided into their four categories. The two 
measures for investment are foreign direct investment (FDI) in US dollars and foreign portfolio 
investment (FPI) in US dollars. Here the sizes of the sums become problematic because, as 
previously mentioned, larger economies tend to attract larger amount of investment. The 
discipline in interpreting the results is to look carefully at the shape and degree of the graphic 
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lines, rather than their height. The starting point in the year 2000 in relation to their end point in 
2013 is more important for the research question than strict amounts. The third group of 
measures is an indicator of economic policy: average applied tariff (AAT) and ease of starting a 
foreign business (determined by time taken to acquire permits, accessibility of necessary 
resources etc.). These measures are not taken on a year by year basis, but instead are to be 
considered as a static snapshot of where these economies are today in terms of their 
liberalization policies.  
Data for the trade and investment dimensions was collected from World Bank’s website, 
which provides statistical research materials for public use up to 2013. The remaining 
dimension, economic policy indicators, was collected from the World Trade Organization 
(WTO)’s 2014 World Tariff Profiles. One final note should be made about the results collected. 
Due to two phenomena, the bifurcated world economy prior to the end of the Soviet Empire, and 
the difficulty in collecting data from particularly opaque political contexts, there are occasional 
holes in the numbers. Particularly in the case of FPI, some countries have seen very little of this 
type of investment officially reported, not surprisingly the problem is acute for data collection 
from autocracies. Likewise, some of the eastern European, former Soviet bloc countries, not to 
mention Russia itself, didn’t have economic information published prior to about 1993-1994 
through World Bank or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or WTO. In terms 
of the dimensions themselves, almost all the data is robust (with the exceptions described 
above) but for one category: trade in services. This was not treated by World Bank as having 
necessitated its own focused data prior to 2005, with the upshot for this research being that only 
eight years of information were available.     
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 Analysis of the Data 
The data tells two different stories, elucidated and graphically represented below. In 
accordance with the bulk of existing literature on the subject of economic liberalization, there are 
many robust differences to be observed between the openness of autocracies and 
democracies. That autocracies tend to favor a closed or protective approach to economic 
stewardship is particularly visible in the policy dimension (average applied tariffs and ease of 
starting a foreign business), where tariffs are distinctly higher among the autocratic groups and 
the ease of starting a foreign business is distinctly lower. Likewise for the investment dimension, 
a preference is shown toward democratic regimes as recipients of foreign capital. Here the 
distinction is clearer for the foreign portfolio investment (FPI) data. The challenge to the 
investment data comes from the tendency of larger economies, and especially larger economies 
with high growth rates, to attract greater sums of capital. It is certainly no revelation to declare 
that democracies tend to have larger, more diversified economies, however, two major 
aberrances to this trend are included in the “Autocracies with Strong Networks” category 
(Russia and China). On the other hand, average size of economy in the “Democracies with 
Strong Networks” category far outstrips its opposite, “Autocracies with Weak Networks”. 
Therefore, in interpreting the graphic data, it is important to adopt an analytical lens that 
privileges trends as well as degrees. Where necessary or instructive, the data was controlled for 
larger economies and new graphs were generated.  
Equally important to bear in mind on the trade dimension is precisely what the “% of 
GDP” measure is indicating. More than a measure of how competitive or successful a nation's 
trade infrastructure is, the data tells how dependent on imports or exports of various kinds an 
economy is. Thus, the United States may be less dependent on external trade than Cote 
d’Ivoire, while remaining far less sensitive to the rise and fall of certain commodities and 
exporting a far more diverse range of goods and services. An attempt to capture some of this 
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more complex appraisal was made by including the categories “Trade in Manufacturing as % of 





A few economic trends, clearly illustrated by the FDI data, will persist as common 
themes across most, if not all, of the data. For the most part, the story of increasing or 
decreasing influxes of wealth is a shared one, with global forces governing a “master trend” until 
the recovery from the 2008 financial crisis. This correspondent tendency across the data is most 
clearly seen in two separate episodes: first, the steady increase of investment activity since 
1990, and second, the universal decrease (albeit temporary) in capital inflows in 2008. From 



















sharp increase in investment after the crisis, a trend that was established throughout the 2000s 
but gains even more momentum post-2008. Democracies with strong local networks also see 
robust investment returning after the crisis. By far the least subject to potentially destabilizing 
(given the relative sizes of their economies) inflows and outflows of cash are autocracies with 
weak local networks, represented by a far smoother gradient indicating a cooler investment 
climate toward the group. While democracies with weak local networks fare hardly any better 
than their autocratic counterparts in terms of sums, the erratic nature of their capital flows 
suggest greater openness. 
 
 
As previously noted, investment tends to gravitate toward larger economies. To 
compensate for one of the weaknesses of the “autocracies with strong networks” group, the 
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networks, and controls for the two largest economies, Russia and China. The results are 
dramatically different, showing a clear preference on the part of investors for the democracies 
with strong local networks group. However, regardless of whether democratic institutions create 
more investment prone environments, the FDI data supports the notion asserted by Global 




 Foreign portfolio investment implies a willingness on the part of investors to make long-
term capital commitments. It can reasonably be expected that a national investment climate will 
be thoroughly scrutinized before any money changes hands, and that investors will be ultra-
sensitive to risks in making a determination on whether or not capital will be well placed for the 
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activity. Autocratic regimes are by and large notorious for a contemptuous, or at the very least 
fickle, attitude towards individual property rights. An investor would be wary of his or her hard-
won capital being potentially expropriated by a cash strapped dictator. The presence of Global 
Compact networks, however, seems to make a considerable difference in this evaluation. While 
the enthusiasm for investing in an autocracy with a strong network (bearing in mind the relative 
size of the two BRICS economies included in the group) is roughly a third of that shown for its 
democratic counterparts, it is still remarkably higher than the “autocracies-without” group. 
The two democratic groups, with their reputation for accountability and rule of law, far 
outperform the autocrats in this type of investment. Perhaps contradicting the spirit of a portfolio 
investment, capital inflows and outflows appear even more volatile on this measure than they do 
for FDI, and democracies with strong networks appear especially susceptible to the shocks. 
Their fortunes see a deeper trough than democracies without strong local networks, which 
otherwise keep up with the GC membership group in terms of amounts invested. However, 
mirroring democracies with strong networks’ apparent capital flight around 2006 and again in 
2009 is a muscular recovery since the crisis, to unprecedented levels of FPI approaching 
national averages of $20 billion.   
Economic Policy Indicators 
 The most generic measure of economic openness, average applied tariffs (AATs) 
comprises the first half of the policy dimension. Rather than observe trends over time, AATs (as 
well as the second dimension: ease of starting a foreign business) are taken as a static picture, 
a snapshot of where the state is today in terms of its levels of protectionism. Democracies show 
themselves to be more open and less prone to protecting their borders than autocracies, both 
democratic groups scoring lower (and therefore more welcoming to imports) than autocracies. 
However, the differences within democratic/autocratic groups are not what the thesis hypothesis 
would predict. In a reversal of the investment data, it is autocracies with strong local networks 
that levy the highest tariffs on foreign goods and services, considerably above those with weak 
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networks. This is not necessarily problematic for the hypothesis, which predicts any positive 
effects of the Global Compact on economic openness to be found only in democracies. It may in 
fact lend some support to the idea that the inverse of the hypothesis takes place in autocracies: 
those with GC networks may become gradually more cautious of private businesses advocating 
a progressive agenda within their borders, and signs of this skepticism could appear in national 
economic policy. This could not explain, however, why an autocracy wouldn’t simply prohibit GC 
membership within its borders, rather than allow it to affect policy.  
The democratic groups pose the greater question. Why would democracies with weak 
local networks impose, on average, more than a percentage point lower tariffs than those with 
strong networks? Certainly the high representation of European Union (EU) countries affects the 
average score, but even when controlled for EU nations the democracies with weak local 
networks group have slightly lower AATs. Little is revealed by the second half of the policy 
indicator dimension, ease of starting a foreign business, beyond what might be expected 
between democracies and autocracies. Considering the wider numerical margins, the 
percentage point or so of variation in favor of democracies with strong networks over those with 
weak ones doesn’t appear to be as significant as the variation in AATs. Autocracies make life 
considerably harder for foreigners looking to set up shop within their borders, but again it is the 
autocracies without GC networks that fare worst on the economic indicator dimension, Sudan 
scoring the lowest of any country here examined. If a causal argument specific to ease of 
starting a foreign business were to be made using Global Compact presence as the 
independent variable, it might run along the following lines: autocratic regimes with strong local 
networks compensate for the admission of a progressive agenda into their business sector by 
limiting foreign influence in domestic enterprise through other channels, namely, by impeding 
the establishment of foreign firms.            
The relative difference in the ease of starting a foreign business in autocracies with 
strong networks vs. weak ones is around 7%, as seen in the Economic Indicators table in the 
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appendix. By contrast, the two presumably polar groups, democracies with strong networks and 
autocracies with weak networks, see a difference of only around 10%. At such an early stage in 
the analysis of results, and in accordance with the earlier findings on the investment dimension, 
the most likely explanation for such a considerable variation within the autocratic groups is the 
sophistication of those particular economies. If the Global Compact is not treated as a causal 
factor, these findings still serve to make sense of the environments in which the Global Compact 
operates. The more economically advanced autocracies are either shrewd in their economic 
stewardship, and willing to host an initiative that champions principles that many of them have 
been critical of (China, for example, is notoriously hostile to labor rights) in exchange for the 
benefits that come with reformist credentials, or else they see some shared interests with the 
GC. China, despite its antipathy to organized labor, has gone to astonishing lengths under Xi 
Jinping’s administration to purge corruption (principle number 10), and made strides toward 
enacting sustainable green policies. It does seem clear from the policy data, however, that 
these same economies, which tend to be subject to greater governmental regulation, favor a 
more autonomous approach to development, and are sensitive to influence from without, in 
spite of their strong GC networks.  
Trade 
While constituting the most conventional (and probably the most intuitive) measure of 
economic openness, trade as a percentage of GDP should also be seen as a measure of an 
economy’s dependence on trade. A country like the Slovak Republic, with an export led 
economy that also depends on vast energy imports from Russia for its output, will be highly 
dependent on trade and therefore open by necessity. Trade in the Slovak Republic accounts for 
twice their proportional GDP when compared to many developed countries, the United States 
included. In many ways these countries are paragons of globalization, and likely more sensitive 
to the trappings of interdependence like free trade areas or political conflicts that threaten to 
disrupt trade. 
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i) Imports, as a % of GDP 
 
Immediately striking for the import dimension is not only the relative independence of 
national GDPs with strong GC presence on imports, but also the similarities in trend and 
amount. For both autocracies and democracies with strong GC networks, a steady but 
modest rise in imports as a percentage of GDP is seen from 1990 onward, with an increase 
of around 5% from 1990 to 2013. Also for both groups a higher level of trade activity 
(acceleration in the amounts imported as well as more erratic relationships with trade 
partners) can be seen after the year 2000. Without looking to the Global Compact as a 
cause, it seems fair to say that the global trading culture the GC was born into and adopted 
by was set to become increasingly unpredictable. For the democratic half of the duo, the 






















































































accurately, felt acutely by their trading partners), whereas the autocratic contingent were 
more insulated. All four groups circa 2012 felt the general downturn in import behavior. 
Autocracies with weak networks exhibit considerably higher rates of dependence on 
imports, and see increases of around 12% during the same timeframe. Their rate of imports 
rose at a higher gradient between 2000 and 2008, but the post-crisis drop is of roughly the 
same amount as the other groups, before picking back up in 2010. The headline for this 
dataset is democracies with weak networks, initiating a trend for the trade dimension. These 
economies were already importing more in the 1990s than the other groups, and 
accelerated to a 20-point rise by 2013, far above the levels shown by democracies with 
strong networks.       
ii) Exports, as a % of GDP 
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The first two trade indicators taken in conjunction provide a broad picture of each 
groups’ trading relationship with the world. An even match between lines would indicate a 
balance, and discrepancies in a given year point to a surplus or deficit for the group. Barring 
economic catastrophes (of which there are a few), and given the aggregate nature of the data it 
can be expected that the export and import trends roughly mirror one another. States like to 
avoid large trade deficits as far as possible, and few are lucky enough to push their wares out 
into the world without needing something in return. Indeed, the general trends remain stable, 
with increases in exporting being the norm across all four groups. Both democracies and 
autocracies with strong GC networks are once again modest in their movement towards 
interdependence, with autocracies aping democracies in their export behavior post-2008 far 
more closely than with their imports.  
Autocracies with weak networks are frequently at a disadvantage, with major problems 
briefly before the millennium in terms of their trade balance and an unsure recovery vis-à-vis the 
global market post-2008. Seen below in a three-dimensional graph (with distinct color coding) is 
each group’s import and export behavior. There exists a broad gap between autocracies with 
weak networks’ export and import levels, in favor of imports. For a very brief moment in time, 
around 2006, the divide was bridged, only to plunge out of equilibrium again. In contrast with the 
two groups with Global Compact presence, who are able to keep a consistent modicum of 
balance in their trade relationships, autocracies with weak networks have been thus far unable 
to solve their deficit problem, with exports nose-diving around 2011. However, in spite of the 
related budget issues, these countries are undeniably very globalized. Taking full advantage of 
the resurgent market after 2008 have been democracies with weak networks. Again (and 
expectedly) showing itself to be the most economically open group, democracies that have 
avoided the Global Compact appear to have relatively export-led economies, accounting for well 
clear of 60% of GDP by the end of the data timeframe and marking a rise of around 25% from 
export levels in 1990. These countries have also frequently shown a willingness to suffer a 
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deficit in their trade relationships, but seem to have emerged from 2008 with strong positive 
trends in favor of their export-based businesses.  
 
    
iii) Merchandise Trade, as % of GDP 
The merchandise trade category was chosen as a means to paint a more detailed 
picture of the economic make-up of the groups, or, of the environment in which the GC 
operates. Most significant about these results is, again, the nature of the environments in which 
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the GC does not operate. Very clearly leading the merchandise trade category, once again, are 
democracies with weak global compact networks, whose annual trade in merchandise roughly 
equals their entire GDP. The other three groups cluster together at between 50%-60% GDP 
equivalent to merchandise trade.  
 
   
iv) Services Trade, as % of GDP 
 Showing greater diversity between groups than merchandise trade, trade in services still 
continues to exemplify democracies with weak GC networks as the most open trading group. 
The data is weaker than that for other sets, limited to the period 2005-2013, but manages to 
demonstrate certain tendencies in the groups nonetheless. Both sets of autocracies have 
gradually decreased the relevance of services trade to their economies since 2005. While 
democracies with strong networks have increased since the beginning of the dataset, the uptick 
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has been modest. Democracies with weak networks have increased their trade of this nature in 
an almost mirror opposite fashion to the trend shown by autocracies with weak networks. 
Services trade has shown itself to be much less volatile than the more tangible merchandise 
kind, producing level trends and gradual increases and decreases. The amounts accounted for 
are also noticeably smaller.  
 
 
 What the Data Means 
 For the hypothesis to have stood up to the math, clear increases in globalization 
“behavior” across the two temporal categories would have to have been observable in the 
graphs for democracies with GC presence between 2000 and 2013. The static measure (the 
policy dimension) would have had to demonstrate a corresponding preference for low tariffs and 





















































































validation of the hypothesis would have been relatively negligible moves toward liberalization on 
the part of the democracies with weak networks, and increasing skepticism (demonstrated by 
closing borders to trade and investment) on the part of autocracies with strong networks. The 
autocracies with weak networks category could have likewise moved against the grain of its 
autocratic competitor. This has clearly not been the case for the trade or policy dimensions. 
With no wish to stumble in self-delusion through the unwelcoming streets of mathematical 
contradiction, it must be conceded that something very different is happening. Despite the lack 
of support for two thirds of the hypothesis, strong and meaningful assertions can be made from 
the data about the role of the Global Compact in the world. Also, in contrast particularly to the 
trade dimension, investors seem to be using a different set of calculations that may provide 
support for the hypothesis.  
 The goal of establishing a clear causal relationship between the Global Compact and 
economic liberalization was always distant in light of an enormous range of spurious factors. 
However, in light of the data and by a slight shift in the orientation of analysis, the original 
hypothesis will be recalibrated to examine the contexts in which the GC operates. Just as 
important to the business case for (or against) the GC will be an examination of the contexts in 
which the GC does not operate. In the case of the trade dimension this latter consideration 
happens to be the most fertile ground for drawing conclusions. Through this lens, the above 
stated research question, “How has the Global Compact affected economic policy in countries 
with strong GC local networks?” becomes “What sort of economic environments are 
encouraging/discouraging of strong GC local networks?” From the narrow confines of trying to 
establish that A causes B, this discussion will henceforth turn to pragmatic, topographical 
analysis of both the trade and policy dimensions. A return to the original frame of analysis will 
be allowed, for the sake of speculation, on the investment dimension. This should be prefaced 
with a cautionary note that investors, like manufacturers, service providers and policy makers, 
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factor many things into a consideration of where and how to invest, and it is not the intention of 
the author to run wild with conclusions. 
   The most glaring empirical departure from the hypothesis, and the most compelling 
data, is provided by the trading phenomena observed in democracies with weak networks. 
These countries show remarkably higher levels of globalization across this dimension, being 
economically reliant on their external commercial relationships to a considerable degree. At 
the same time, the respective business communities in this most extroverted of trading 
cliques apparently show no interest in the world’s largest corporate responsibility initiative. It 
is the contention of this author that actors in a highly extroverted economy will be less likely 
to sign up to corporate responsibility regimes to seek advantage in the international 
marketplace by their relative freedom from ideological positions. Put simply, those who rely 
heavily on their international relationships for economic survival are prone to be business 
conservatives, and therefore conduct “business as usual”. There is a certain pessimistic 
intuitiveness to this line of thought. If Papa New Guinea’s main trading partner were China, 
PNG might be sensitive to the risk of being perceived by its largest export market as 
pushing an ideology of labor rights in a country that is famously critical of unionization. This 
in turn begs the question “why does China allow the Global Compact to operate within its 
borders?”. Regardless of China’s business environment, the assumption from PNG is that 
value-free trading will prove more secure in the long term. The extroverted business 
community may also find more opportunities in conjunction with a less restrained playbook. 
The decision not to sign up for a corporate responsibility initiative, it must be stressed, does 
not necessarily denote an immoral business culture, or one that seeks any advantage no 
matter how predatory the means. There is simply a wish to operate off the ESG radar.  
There are problems with this position, as one would expect. A challenge for the 
following discussion is the requirement of parsimony, to refer to presumably diverse and 
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vibrant domestic business cultures as monolithic entities, as well as groups of business 
cultures, a dozen or more strong, in the same vain. The same problem will be encountered 
with investors and policy makers. Specific to issues with the above stated explanation for 
the trade data, the dominance of European Union-acceded nations in the democracies with 
weak GC membership category may present a challenge. The purpose of joining (and 
indeed, creating) the common market in Europe was always one of economic incentive. 
Relatively more trading can be expected from members of a free trade zone that also 
happens to be the world’s largest single market. Does this account for the variation from the 
other democratic category? Some authors in the field have commented on the reasons for 
the GC’s delayed adoption in the United States. The consensus has been that the States’ 
litigious culture made many potential signatories wary of the thought of an annual 
communication on progress (Kell, 2013,). Could some set of shared cultural considerations 
beyond an emphasis on trade be shaping these countries’ decisions not to adopt UN-style 
corporate responsibility? Is there something specific in the products being exported by 
these countries that don’t necessitate ESG reform? Finally, the data shows conflicting 
outcomes between democracies and autocracies with GC presence- as predicted by the 
hypothesis- but its inverse. Autocracies with GC networks are seen to be more open on the 
trade dimension than their political brethren, while democracies with GC networks are less 
open. Why should this be the case?  
 The most fundamental critique of the above theory however, before any of the finer 
points can be examined, is this: are these democracies simply less enthusiastic about ESG 
issues? This would go a long way toward explaining their abstention from the Global 
Compact, and while we generally think of democracies as progressive and in favor of these 
sorts of values, it is good to test our assumptions every once in a while. Good science has 
foundered on broadly accepted pretexts that have later proven problematic, and more than 
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once. To address this possibility, the United Nations’ Human Rights Council Universal 
Periodic Reviews (most recent data ranging from 2008 to 2013 for all member states) of the 
twelve democracies with weak GC networks have been examined and briefly summarized 
in the following few paragraphs.  
New Zealand and Ireland are each lauded for their strong traditions of protecting and 
promoting human rights. New Zealand was the first nation in the world to give women the 
right to vote. Its indigenous population, the Maori, and settling historic claims provide the 
island nation with its largest human rights challenges, which it appears to be facing up to in 
fine style. The broad scope of international obligations, and history of support for 
international conventions and declarations, as well as the successful national 
implementation of international treaties, all indicate a firm champion of human rights. Ireland 
similarly has a legislative review process that ensures all laws passed by parliament are in 
accordance with international human rights obligations. It has gone as far as to establish 
distinct and independent human rights institutions in government, the Irish Human Rights 
Commission, the Equality Authority and the Equality Tribunal, among others, to ensure a 
pluralistic and open society. Most significantly for the argument under consideration, both 
countries have acceded to a broad spectrum of international human rights treaties and 
covenants… but not the Global Compact.  
The Eastern European bloc of this group have largely followed the provisos in the 
UN Paris Principles and established autonomous human rights agencies within their own 
governments charged with raising awareness and promoting the observation of human 
rights. In some cases, such as Latvia, international law precedents on human rights have 
been adopted by the domestic legal systems. All have acceded to the major UN human 
rights instruments, as well as those of the International Labor Organization. Most have also 
issued standing invitations to the special UN human rights procedures- a type of human 
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rights “merit badge” in the UN system. Most have also adopted human rights into their core 
education curricula. The human rights issues faced by these countries, such as secret CIA 
extraditions in the Czech Republic or human trafficking Slovakia, are usually human rights 
challenges imposed on the nation from without. The shared domestic issue faced by the 
East Europe bloc is discrimination, often on the grounds of sexual orientation. The countries 
have uniformly taken steps to strengthen anti-discrimination legislation when it has arisen. 
The weakest performer in the bloc on ESG issues is Romania, with recurrent concerns 
regarding high level and local corruption, mistreatment of detainees in its penal facilities and 
discrimination (HRC, 2008-2014).  
Botswana has acceded to all major human rights treaties and conventions. It 
protects minority rights within its borders, ensures access to justice, freedom of the press, 
and has mainstreamed human rights training for its police force. It is also tolerant of trade 
unions. All told, Botswana is a model for successful human rights implementation in Africa. 
A telling demonstration of the government’s resolve in this area has been to initiate 
programs that train “traditional leaders” (tribal elders etc.) in international, human rights-
oriented distribution of justice. Some tension exists between the culture in Botswana and 
UN norms, for instance Botswana’s retention of the death penalty and corporal punishment 
in schools. These are by no means indicative of a national mentality suspicious of the UN 
human rights regime. Botswana has shown broad and resolute support of social 
responsibility norms (HRC, 2008).  
The most problematic for the group, therefore potentially providing an ideological 
explanation for abstention from GC networks, are Sri Lanka and Papua New Guinea. The 
former had the misfortune of being embroiled in a bloody and drawn out civil conflict until 
2009, which tends to stain national human rights records. It would be unfair to assume that 
the government of Sri Lanka was thus brushing away all international pressure to improve 
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its record at a difficult time: during its Universal Periodic Review, in 2012, Sri Lanka was 
working on implementing no less than 71 UN recommendations for the protection of rights. 
Of the group, Papua New Guinea is the most reticent when it comes to dealing 
substantively with the international community. It experiences widespread discrimination 
against women, increasingly frequent sorcery killings, domestic abuse and a lack of 
freedom of information, but takes fewer steps and involves fewer international instruments 
than its counterparts to effectively tackle these problems. The important point to consider for 
the democracies with weak networks group is not necessarily the human rights situation in 
country per se, but rather the way each nation interfaces with the international community to 
address ESG issues. With the possible exception of Papua New Guinea, the group is 
shown to be highly cooperative and treaty-prone. The likelihood of GC abstention relating to 
ideological qualms is very limited.       
Six states from the European Union are represented in the Democracies without GC 
Networks category: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Ireland and Romania, a 
full half of the dataset, and certainly enough to influence the results should the EU’s effect 
on trade be strong enough. Each of these nations has enormous incentives to adopt a 
trade-oriented approach to economic stewardship. If the extroversion observed in the group 
were in fact par for the course for the EU, it would have to be conceded that the Global 
Compact was not part of the equation. Or rather, that there is nothing remarkable about the 
group’s shunning of the GC, and its propensity toward hyper-globalization was simply a 
feature of the EU and its low barriers. This is not the case. At year 1 for the data (1990), the 
European Union average percentage of GDP accounted for by its exports was twenty-five, 
and by 2013 that figure reached forty two percent. Likewise for imports, the twenty-three 
years under review saw an increase from twenty six to thirty nine percent. When compared 
to the four groups, the EU average is slightly higher on both trade metrics than both 
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autocratic groups and democracies with strong networks, but significantly lower than the 
democracies with weak networks group. By 2013, the group in question chalked up an 
additional twenty percent of its GDP from trade compared to the European Union. In relative 
terms, these six nations are considerably more open to and reliant upon trade than their 
European neighbors.  
 In terms of litigation, or other idiosyncratic domestic concerns within these 
democracies that may prompt a cautious approach to the GC on the part of respective 
business communities, sheer complexity makes it difficult to render indicators. Much of what 
is said about the maligned “litigious society” centers around introspective outrage within the 
United States at a society encouraged to get something for nothing through the filing of 
frivolous lawsuits. The McDonalds coffee-spilling incident has become both “Munich” and 
“Saigon” to this particular debate. However, the focus has only recently expanded to include 
nations outside of the US, and apparently only for comparative purposes. Even this cautious 
peek outside of America’s borders has thus far included only a few west European 
countries. As a result, no comprehensive system is in place to rank countries by their 
frequency or per capita incidence of lawsuits filed against businesses or people, and much 
is left to speculation and opinion. A poor substitute, perhaps, but Oded Shenkar and 
Yadong Luo in their textbook on international business use a ranking of “fair administration 
of justice” to exemplify the international environment of litigation. Only two of the 
democracies with weak networks (Ireland and New Zealand) make it into the top twenty-five 
on this ranking (Shenkar & Luo, p200). No country from either autocratic group made the 
top twenty-five (while over half from the democracies with strong networks were 
represented). Other literature on the subject corroborates the story: Ireland and New 
Zealand are referenced in the same breath as the United States in terms of their propensity 
to litigate (Edwards, p.446). 
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Looking to the rest of Europe, some illumination of the legal environments in the six 
countries in question is offered by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 
(CEPEJ), a review and advisory body. In terms of the public budget allocated to courts (per 
capita) for purposes other than legal aid and criminal prosecution, the Czech Republic 
spends the most (€35) of the six, and Romania the least (€15), but not one of the “weak 
network six” tops the European Union average of thirty-nine euros. Likewise, in terms of the 
number of incoming non-criminal cases per one hundred inhabitants, only Estonia, with 
twenty, beats the European Union average of fourteen cases (CEPEJ, p46, 82). The rest of 
the group is considerably below average on this litigation metric, too. At least for the half of 
the democracies with weak networks group comprised of EU member states, the challenge 
that their non-adoption of the Global Compact is due to domestic legal concerns, rather than 
extroversion, does not stand under scrutiny. With the possible exception of Ireland, 
evidence points to these being among Europe’s least litigious societies.  
Very little can be found alluding to the emergence of lawyer-happy cultures in 
Botswana, Papua New Guinea or Tunisia. In Taiwan, there are rumblings of a change in 
direction from the nation’s traditionally inquisitorial legal system towards the American 
model of adversarial, attorney-centric proceedings. This system is sometimes criticized as a 
systemic cause of lawsuit proliferation, a phenomena some are beginning to point to in 
Taipei (Copper, p. 253). Another group member with an adversarial court system, Sri 
Lanka, has been criticized (though by dubious sources) for its frequent recourse to lawsuits 
after the 2004 tsunami. Use of the country’s “Fundamental Rights” law is also common in 
disputes between minorities and the government. However, there is scant evidence to 
suggest that a business-threatening legal culture exists.  
Another indicator, one that does not specifically demonstrate the domestic legal 
environment but certainly implies it, is the World Bank’s “ease of doing business” ranking. 
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Estonia, Latvia, Ireland and New Zealand are all found in World Bank’s top twenty-five 
business friendly countries, while the rest of the group are scattered somewhere around 
fiftieth place (World Bank, 2014), with the exception of Taiwan. Thanks to China’s influence 
in World Bank, the global financial institution does not report on Taiwan as a sovereign 
entity. For a consideration of the island state as an autonomous nation, an equivalent 
annual ranking on Forbes places Taiwan in the top twenty countries for doing business 
(Forbes, 2014). In contradiction of the “litigious societies” explanation, this group of 
democracies seems to be on average slightly more business friendly and, on the whole, 
less litigious than neighbors of the respective group members (consider Australia, England, 
Germany or India, all of whom exhibit muscular legal cultures). 
Could it be the case that the group in question has a comparative advantage in a 
rudimentary area of production that, through universal demand or meeting demand in the 
underdeveloped world (which may have less expectations when it comes to human rights 
and anti-corruption efforts- or may have expectations to the contrary of GC principles) does 
not associate as naturally with ESG issues? This seems unlikely. Two of the above datasets 
were collected to obviate such a possibility by giving a more detailed picture of the nature of 
each group’s trade. If merchandise trade had far outstripped services trade for the 
democracies with weak networks group, the notion would bear more interrogation, but 
instead a clear lead is demonstrated in both types of trade. These are diverse, modern 
economies. On closer inspection of the trade profiles of each country it is revealed that the 
primary trading partners of each are relatively unlikely to be autocratic. Only 50% of the 
group have an autocracy in their top three trading partners, and most often these are big 
market autocracies like Russia and China that have strong GC networks (WTO, 2014).  
Finally, are the calculations that lead to avoidance or adoption of the Global 
Compact by the domestic business communities in democracies the same as those made in 
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autocracies? Across the trade dimension it cannot be ignored that, regardless of political 
system, those without GC networks tend to be more globalized. While autocracies without 
GC networks tend to be African, Middle Eastern or Central Asian, often with dubious human 
rights records and famously corrupt governments, it would be presumptive to assume that 
their respective private sectors (beholden to government, as many of them are) share some 
mass antipathy to human rights (though a case might be made for mass antipathy to labor 
rights). It seems reasonable to make room for skepticism in much of the former colonial 
world when confronted with foreign (western) institutions and initiatives. The colonial past 
may well factor into the decision-making processes in autocracies, where it was largely 
absent in the democratic group. 
The rationale employed by the autocracies with weak networks group is likely to be 
similar but more complex than the proposed rationality of the democratic group (that strong 
reliance on external trade may breed a conservative approach to modern corporate 
responsibility). The relative freedom from government intervention of a democratic business 
community demonstrates a sanctified separation of public and private in many democracies. 
Moreover, the trend over the course of recent history has been toward privatization, not 
nationalization, in most (though not all) countries with legitimate elections. The converse is 
true in most autocracies, where business is often either a direct function of government, 
subject to clientelism, or at the very least engaged in the reciprocal appropriation of favors 
in the form of protectionism, kickbacks, government contracts or access to foreign aid. To 
sign onto a corporate responsibility initiative that encourages businesses to cultivate a 
climate of anti-corruption norms, and furthermore requires a report on progress each year, 
makes little strategic sense in an environment like this. All of which begs the question, why 
do any companies in autocratic regimes sign up for the Global Compact? The answer may 
be laid bare in the investment analysis.      
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The investment data tells a very different story. Leaving aside for a moment the 
autocracies with strong networks’ apparent success in attracting large amounts of foreign 
investment, the trade dimension’s unrivaled front runners are relegated to much more 
mortal performance through the prism of FDI. Democracies with weak networks seem to 
have attracted barely more revenue than the autocracies that also shun the GC. The 
problem comes from trying to gauge how much, if any, of the diversity in capital inflows can 
be attributed to a business environment that espouses human rights norms. While a strong 
culture of human rights may suggest to investors that their money is going to a more 
responsible recipient in conditions governed by the rule of law, the peace of mind that this 
provokes may be offset by the inclusion of labor rights, which suggest to many business 
conservatives the prospect of meddlesome, inefficient unions. Add to this plurality of 
ideological strains within the GC’s moral architecture an inclination for cash to flow naturally 
toward bigger economies (which are not necessarily democratic, or concerned with people’s 
rights), and the data looks more suggestive than conclusive. Fortunately, there are 
increasingly tall shoulders for the data to stand on, and a swelling bulk of work that props up 
the assertion that human rights and good governance are positively correlated with 
investment.  
Under FDI, although both groups with GC networks lead the pack, controlling for the 
two largest economies (Russia and China) has the effect of practically tying the autocracies 
with strong networks with the autocracies with weak networks group. This effect is seen 
again (without the need to control for Russia and China) in the FPI data. Investors show a 
clear preference for democracies when they know their money is going to be engaged over 
the long term. Despite the apparent volatility of this kind of investment, there seems to have 
been little to no interest in portfolio investment in autocracies with weak networks at any 
time. 
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 The traditional narrative on the relationship between investment and human rights is 
one of inherent tension (Blanton & Blanton, 2007). Broadly speaking, conventional wisdom 
has held that coercive political environments make for more attractive investment climates 
due to the host government’s ability to suppress protest, hold down labor costs and supply 
favors. Nowhere is this more forcefully laid out than in the neo-Marxist critiques of the ‘60s 
and ‘70s, which focus on systemic pressures to maintain growth and profitability and the 
rationality of moving production abroad as domestic conditions become less favorable. As 
labor use shifts from core to periphery, a population that can be exploited and controlled by 
its own elites makes the most sense to employ, thus a perpetual situation of dependency 
arises. The world’s poorest populations are therefore of essential value to advanced 
capitalist firms, but only in a subordinated, oppressed condition. The dictatorial regimes 
governing them solicit capital by peddling a repressive political situation of their own making 
on the international market as an asset of inestimable worth. Key to an understanding of 
this view is the reciprocal nature of the relationship between repressive governments and 
foreign capital (Blanton & Blanton, 2007). 
Increasingly, empirical support for this point of view is slipping away. Three important 
developments have shifted the rules of the game and made modern investors more prone 
to do business with human rights respecting governments. First, the emergence of 
a  “spotlight regime”, a desirable by-product of the information age, has had the effect of 
naming and shaming numerous corporations who could previously have turned a blind eye 
to human rights abuse (or even abetted it) with impunity. Corporations have become 
sensitive to any public association between their brand image and abusive behavior, and 
along with that sensitivity, awareness that today’s lightning fast pace of communication 
necessitates firms’ staying in front of issues before they make the news. As in Myanmar in 
2000, accusations of labor abuse from the United States led to immediate and precipitous 
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outflows of FDI (Blanton & Blanton, 2007). Second, there has been a broad decrease in the 
share of investment costs attributed to labor. Between 1970 and 1990, on average, the 
portion of production costs comprised of labor dropped to less than half its original figure. 
This phenomenon implies a mitigation of the pressures to keep labor costs as low as 
possible, as they cease to be a primary expenditure. Of course minimizing expenditure will 
still be desirable, but lower costs mean more room for decision-makers to factor in other 
concerns (for instance, the spotlight regime). Third, the increasing diversification of FDI has 
taken much of the global share of investment away from primary commodity exports such 
as petroleum. There is mounting empirical evidence that companies now prioritize quality of 
labor over low cost, an observation logically supported by the development of efficiency-
driven technology. For a skilled labor pool, education and opportunities are necessary. 
These suggest, without necessitating, a respect for human rights. In sum, the paradigm of 
profitability coming at the expense of local populations looks outdated (Blanton & Blanton, 
2007). 
One study from the University of Memphis (Blanton & Blanton, 2007) used statistical 
regression and control measures for relative economic size to demonstrate an increase of 
4% of GDP accounted for by FDI between abusive regimes and those that respect human 
rights. The positive, indirect effects of investment in terms of human capital also served to 
shore up and solidify human rights norms, generating a virtuous cycle between investment 
and respect for populations. Put another way, “developing countries that respect human 
rights are more successful in attracting foreign direct investment than those characterized 
by… abusive practices” (Blanton & Blanton, 2007). Some autocracies, notably those in the 
autocracies with strong networks group, seem to have taken this message on board. 
Whether they do so nominally, in a cynical bid for investment capital, or through genuine 
openness to different modes of operation, is rather an important question. In the end, the 
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efficacy of the Global Compact at bringing about its stated goals, compliance with the ten 
principles, will determine its impact. This is beyond the purview of the research question 
addressed here, but it seems reasonable to say that positively influencing the conditions “on 
the ground” in this group will be the GC’s greatest challenge. The above data provides 
further support for the emergent narrative that positively correlates human rights and ESG 
responsibility with FDI. Interestingly, considerations for FPI seem to be made more along 
the lines of strict preference for democratic institutions. Political stability and the stronger 
tradition of rule of law associated with democracy appear to be of primary concern for long 
term investments. Still, between the autocratic groups a significantly larger chunk of this 
type of investment was made for all twenty-three years in the autocracies that had adopted 
the GC.  
 Across the policy dimension, presence of GC networks tends to correlate with 
stronger protectionism, therefore relatively more closed economies. In terms of both 
average applied tariffs and ease of starting a foreign business, democracies without GC 
networks are once again the front-runners (though practically tied with the other democratic 
group on the latter metric). Autocracies with strong networks are the most protectionist of 
the four by a significant amount. In the autocratic context, GC presence may be understood 
as the intrepid modernism of a cosseted and evidently well financed business culture. With 
the zealous protection of government trade barriers working in their favor, the respective 
private sectors operate in a risk-reduced environment and adopt cutting edge business 
ideology to attract investment. Another possible explanation, particularly for the difficulty of 
starting a foreign business on these shores, squares with the original hypothesis: that these 
autocratic regimes maintained their protectionist stances partially in response to the 
influence of foreign ideas and norms encroaching on their economic operations. A certain 
degree of contradiction remains in the most economically sheltered group participating in 
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GC local networks. This reflects the natural tension that exists in autocratic regimes, most 
with notorious human rights records, widespread anecdotal evidence of corruption, and 
frequent opposition to labor rights, hosting GC networks in the first place. Another possible 
explanation is that this tension in fact reflects an ideological disparity between business 
communities and government. Where business communities and government are 
operationally tough to separate, it may reflect a fracturing in the government itself. This 
would tally with modernization theory’s prediction that democratic institutions follow in the 
wake of economic progress. Without much further evidence, however, this seems a very 
optimistic (not to mention ethnocentric) conclusion to draw.  
 A more parsimonious and cogent narrative can be drawn from the democracies with 
weak networks policy data. In keeping with the data on trade, these economies are starting 
to look robustly extroverted from the top down. A complementary relationship appears to 
exist between government and the private sector, not of the crony sort, but rather of a 
shared economic vision. These states, previously conceptualized as extroverted business 
conservatives, appear with the addition of the policy metric to be carrying the torch for 
traditional laissez-faire capitalism. Compared to their peers they are open, globally-oriented, 
energetic traders, and not concerned with corporate responsibility initiatives.  
Conclusion 
While investors show a preference for climates that demonstrably adopt ESG norms 
and corresponding initiatives, business environments that are highly dependent on trade 
tend to remain conservative in their attitudes toward globalized corporate responsibility. 
What are the implications of this research in regard to the business case for the Global 
Compact? In one sense, the research makes a strong and practical case for the benefits of 
GC membership, appealing not to utopian, pie-in-the-sky idealism, but instead to people’s 
pocketbooks. Investors are attracted to socially responsible business climates, and the data 
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suggests that Global Compact membership sends a strong, positive message to potential 
recipients. Levels of Foreign Direct and Portfolio investment are clearly higher in countries 
that host strong GC networks. The research also provides a telling caveat to the GC rallying 
cry, that corporate responsibility has “gone global” and contemporary business sees a 
proactive stance on ESG issues as inherently in its favor. When the stakes are high in 
international trade, that is, when an economy becomes highly dependent on its trade 
competitiveness, initiatives that constrain (via transparency and aspirational demands) the 
traditional operation of business are less likely to be adopted. Highly extroverted economies 
are more prone to an old fashioned, tried-and-true conservative business orientation that 
has not as yet seen merit in global corporate responsibility initiatives. This effect is seen in 
the democracies with weak GC networks group and its hyperactive global trading.  
The pressures of the information age “spotlight”, as well as incentives from investors 
and the changing requirements of production are likely to bring these holdout democracies 
into the fold in the not-too-distant future. The laissez-faire approach to capitalism will likely 
continue to hold a certain appeal, but events like the 2008 financial crisis make it politically 
less feasible to apply. As for the autocracies with weak networks, arguably the control group 
for this research, it is tough to say what pressures can be brought to bear to improve 
governance in these countries. Given the symbiotic relationship that many authors have 
observed between oppressive regimes and foreign business interests, a shift on the part of 
the global business community away from egregious practices of old may help kick away a 
long-time crutch from rights abusing autocrats, as the limitation of bilateral aid has done. 
There are many ways for the Global Compact to bring about real change, but it must 
continue to convincingly portray itself as being beneficial to business. While acting in an 
ethical manner is undoubtedly the preference for most, if not all businesses, arguments that 
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invoke a positive outcome for the pocketbooks of CEOs and board members can be 
counted on to resonate most strongly.       
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